this post was submitted on 30 Jan 2024
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Simple solution: Don't connect it to the Internet. Hackers hate this one weird trick.
And said trick ends when an attacker manages to socially-engineer their way in. (But maybe they’ll drop floppies instead of flash drives around the block this time)
You really think that infrastructure IT is dumb unless it can brush off a Stuxnet-like attack by the CIA and Mosad? Most RR traffic signals in the US are run with mechanical logic, physical switches connected to circuits closed by steel wheels on steel tracks. Do you really want a "move fast and break things" tech bro to update all this stuff for us?
All kinds of infrastructure uses ancient software because it's reliable. Updating it just to protect from hackers causing damage is likely to cause that damage unintentionally while doing little to protect from hackers anyhow.
It must be updated sometime or risk being archaic and unmanageable. Chances are high they are paying insane amounts for those legacy mechanical switches you mention.
The actual logic is usually very well portable to a more modern ecosystem.
Or these companies could pay to train (no pun intended) technicians to learn the systems they’d like to maintain. No matter how old they are.
Until entropy comes for the actual hardware (assuming they won’t invest in remanufacture or production of replacements). Re-engineering a successfully working system is more costly and might result in worse outcomes, especially in the near term.
Often these system rely on old components which are just not made anymore.
People don't design every switch, computer and chip themselves. They buy whatever mainstream stuff is available at the time and combine it into a system
If you want to resupply those old parts you literally need to search Ebay to buy some weird outdated 2nd hand MSDOS PC to put in your "awesome reliable railway system".
Upgrading at every new whim is of course bad, but once your system reaches legacy age it's often necessary to fully overhaul and modernize it for the next ~15-20 years.
Every SCADA related cyber attack and incident has entered the chat.
Even if it's archaic, a lot of these systems aren't secure which can be done relatively easily and cheaply with things like basic firewalls and stunnel.
Akshually it was recently found that a spy from Holland I think penetrated a chip supply line and installed an infected chip which found it's way into the centrifuge network
HAHAHA!
I just have to laugh at that idea, since I've been using computers since the days that those OSes were in common use. Reliable is not what I would call a lot of that old stuff for sure.
The bottom line is that ancient software will likely have ancient security vulnerabilities that would be trivial to exploit and take over or destroy those systems. It's not good.
They could socially engineer their way in regardless of some machine being MSDOS or not. Basically if they can gain physical access to the device, or convince somebody to do something with the device it hardly matters what it was running since it can still be compromised.
Sure, but how likely is this in this specific scenario. We're talking about a system that's not even directly controlling the train but just a display on it. The worst that can happen is that those displays won't work until the system is reinstalled. That's hardly a lucrative target for modern hackers. There's way easier target which are worth something.
I’m not talking about this specific instance, just that block of misinformation/generalisation. Saying that legacy systems are well-secured because they’re “battle tested” is sheer ignorance.
Take side-channel attacks for example. A timing attack is something programmers from the 60’s and 70’s would not have taken into account when writing their hashing algorithms. And speaking of hashing, what hashing algorithms were available back then? CRC32 or something similar? What about salting? You get the idea.
Not to mention that legacy operating systems don’t get security updates. Let’s assume that DOS is secure (which it definitely isn’t), but if that statement were correct, would it apply to Windows XP as well?
All I’m saying is that the article is dead wrong. As software developers in this century, we’ve come a long way. We’ve developed security best practices, written libraries and frameworks, and come up with mitigations for a lot of these security vulnerabilities. These solutions are something that closed-source legacy systems (and anything without active maintenance) would never benefit from.