aa1

joined 5 months ago
[–] [email protected] -1 points 1 month ago

That work was not available when GrapheneOS was developed

What do you mean ? This has nothing to do with GrapheneOS in the first place (which by the way has been created in 2014. The article i linked refers to 2021).

I still consider it a black box.

Reverse engineering is a thing. It always has been. If every piece of closed source was a blackbox how can you explain exploitation ? How can bad actors exploit Windows, MacOS, CPU firmware and so on ? Your argument here is not practical. Also, why should Google put a backdoor inside a chip ? They already get every information they what directly from the people agreeing to use their software. So, why bother ? Moreover, every phone on the market has closed source firmware.

[–] [email protected] 15 points 1 month ago (3 children)

The Titan security chip is not a black box. The Titan M1 gas been scrutinazed by blackhat: https://dl.acm.org/doi/fullHtml/10.1145/3503921.3503922

Just because something is not open source does not mean you can't verify it (no, i'm not shilling closed slurce; no i don't think closed > open; no i don't think closed source is more secure)

[–] [email protected] 1 points 3 months ago* (last edited 3 months ago) (1 children)

Braxman's content is pure scam

[–] [email protected] 4 points 3 months ago

Thank you for sharing!

[–] [email protected] 3 points 3 months ago (1 children)

I personally blocked him and it was one of the best decision of my digital life. He's basically wasting his life spreading misinformation about GrapheneOS. He's simply too much to handled for my mind. Without seeing him, i feel this place is much more relaxing and useful to see it.

 

GrapheneOS provides users with the ability to set a duress PIN/Password that will irreversibly wipe the device (along with any installed eSIMs) once entered anywhere where the device credentials are requested (on the lockscreen, along with any such prompt in the OS).

The wipe does not require a reboot and cannot be interrupted. It can be set up at Settings > Security > Duress Password in the owner profile. Both a duress PIN and password will need to be set to account for different profiles that may have different unlock methods.

Note that if the duress PIN/Password is the same as the actual unlock method, the actual unlock method always takes precedence, and therefore no wipe will occur.

Source: https://grapheneos.org/features#duress