Thrashy

From the industry journal I linked in another comment -- it's literally just an off-the-shelf Mireo Plus B. That's it. The only thing Tesla about it is that it's serving a spur line connecting Tesla's factory to the existing Berlin light rail network, and was presumably financed by them for the PR benefit of not having the workers at an electric car factory arrive by diesel train.

I did a little digging and it seems like there's a tiny kernel of fact at the core of this giant turd of a hype-piece, and that is the fact that they electrified this little spur line from Berlin to the new German Tesla factory by using a battery-electric trainset. Which is not a terrible solution for electrifying a very short branch line that presumably doesn't need frequent all-day service, even if it's a bit of a janky approach compared to overhead lines. But hand that off to the overworked, underpaid twenty-two-year old gig worker they've got doing "editing" at Yahoo for two bucks an article, and I guess it turns into "world-first electric wonder train amazes!"

For a second, though, I read the headline and wondered if Musk and co. had finally looped all the way around to reinventing commuter rail from first principles after all these years of trying to "disrupt" it with bullshit ideas like Hyperloop and Tunnels, But Dumber.

That's at least more cultured than my brain shouting "MULATTO BUTTS! (Mulatto butts!)" at me

Right now Intel and AMD have less to fear from Apple than they do from Qualcomm -- the people who can do what they need to do with a Mac and want to are already doing that, it's businesses that are locked into the Windows ecosystem that drive the bulk of their laptop sales right now, and ARM laptops running Windows are the main threat in the short term.

If going wider and integrating more coprocessors gets them closer to matching Apple Silicon in performance per watt, that's great, but Apple snatching up their traditional PC market sector is a fairly distant threat in comparison.

The problem is that the private sector faces the same pressures about the appearance of failure. Imagine if Boeing adopted the SpaceX approach now and started blowing up Starliner prototypes on a monthly basis to see what they could learn. How badly would that play in the press? How quickly would their stock price tank? How long would the people responsible for that direction be able to hold on to their jobs before the board forced them out in favor of somebody who'd take them back to the conservative approach?

Heck, even SpaceX got suddenly cagey about their first stage return attempts failing the moment they started offering stakes to outside investors, whereas previously they'd celebrated those attempts that didn't quite work. Look as well at how the press has reacted to Starship's failures, even though the program has been making progress from launch to launch at a much greater pace than Falcon did initially. The fact of the matter is that SpaceX's initial success-though-informative-failure approach only worked because it was bankrolled entirely by one weird dude with cubic dollars to burn and a personal willingness to accept those failures. That's not the case for many others.

NASA in-house projects were historically expensive because they took the approach that they were building single-digit numbers of everything -- very nearly every vehicle was bespoke, essentially -- and because failure was a death sentence politically, they couldn't blow things up and iterate quickly. Everything had to be studied and reviewed and re-reviewed and then non-destructively tested and retested and integration tested and dry rehearsed and wet rehearsed and debriefed and revised and retested and etc. ad infinitum. That's arguably what you want in something like a billion dollar space telescope that you only need one of and has to work right the first time, but the lesson of SpaceX is that as long as you aren't afraid of failure you can start cheap and cheerful, make mistakes, and learn more from those mistakes than you would from packing a dozen layers of bureaucracy into a QC program and have them all spitball hypothetical failure modes for months.

Boeing, ULA and the rest of the old space crew are so used to doing things the old way that they struggle culturally to make the adaptations needed to compete with SpaceX on price, and then in Boeing's case the MBAs also decided that if they stopped doing all that pesky engineering analysis and QA/QC work they could spend all that labor cost on stock buybacks instead.

Another perovskite hype piece. You'll know that they've got something that's commercially viable once they're making these sorts of efficiency claims and not omitting information about cell degradation.

Given that the first perovskites studied had lifespans that could be measured in minutes, this is great progress, but the fundamental problem is that as a class of materials they just don't want to exist outside of an inert atmosphere. Without significant progress in stability and encapsulation materials, they're more of a research curiosity than a viable real-world PV tech.

A combination of resting on their laurels during AMD's lost decade, and failure to retain competitive process technology during the extended gestation and ultimate failure of their non-EUV 10nm node. The arrogance of taking their foot off the gas and assuming nobody would ever catch back up to them backfired hard.

The reverse. OceanGate saw how planes were being built and said, "let's do that for submersibles!" even though in airplanes, composites are subjected to <1 atmosphere of tension loading and <2g aerodynamic loading, whereas their submersible was going to be subjected to >400 atmospheres of compression loading, and a much more corrosive environment.

Composites in aircraft have a fairly long and uncontroversial history, and there's nothing inherently wrong with them in that application. The biggest problem with composites is what happens with them at the end of their service life. Finding ways to recycle them without compromising safety is a good thing, and if it weren't for Boeing having such a damaged reputation at the moment I think nobody would bat an eye.

The average American house on a basement will have something like 40 m^3 of concrete in its foundation. If all of it could be utilized, that's still ~12kWhr of storage capacity. Nothing to be sneezed at.

Any time you see perovskite-based cells mentioned, you can assume for the time being that it's just R&D. Perovskites are cool materials that open up a lot of neat possibilities, like cheaply inkjet-printing PV cells, but they have fundamental durability issues in the real world. When exposed to water, oxygen, and UV light, the perovskite crystals break down fairly rapidly.

That's not to say that the tech can't be made to work -- at least one lab team has developed cells with longevity similar to silicon PVs -- but somebody's going to have to come up with an approach that solves for performance, longevity, and manufacturability all at once, and that hasn't happened yet. I imagine that when they do, that will be front-and-center in the press release, rather than just an efficiency metric.