Technology

Effective immediately, exporters of products containing Scandium, Dysprosium, Gadolinium, Terbium, Lutetium, Samarium, and Yttrium must apply for an export license from the China Ministry of Economy. The application requires customers to detail the final use of the material.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mountain_Pass_Rare_Earth_Mine

The Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine and Processing Facility, owned by MP Materials, is an open-pit mine of rare-earth elements on the south flank of the Clark Mountain Range in California, 53 miles (85 km) southwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. In 2020 the mine supplied 15.8% of the world's rare-earth production. It is the only rare-earth mining and processing facility in the United States.[1][2] It is the largest single known deposit of such minerals.[3]

As of 2022, work was ongoing to restore processing capabilities for domestic light rare-earth elements (LREEs) and work has been funded by the United States Department of Defense to restore processing capabilities for heavy rare-earth metals (HREEs) to alleviate supply chain risk. [4] The mine was reported as operating in 2025.[5]

https://warontherocks.com/2025/04/a-federal-critical-mineral-processing-initiative-securing-u-s-mineral-independence-from-china/

After China’s 2010 rare earth elements embargo, the United States, the European Union, and Japan filed a case against China at the World Trade Organization, ultimately forcing Beijing to remove export quotas by 2015. The United States also revived rare earth mineral processing, including efforts to reopen the Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine in California. In 2023, Washington intensified its “friendshoring” strategy by allocating additional resources to domestic mining and refining through the Department of Defense and Department of Energy budgets, while also strengthening supply chain partnerships with allies like Canada and Australia.

U.S. efforts to reduce dependence on China for critical minerals face a number of significant hurdles. First, domestic refining expansion remains slow, with new processing plants and smelters taking 10–20 years to become operational. For example, the Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine, which reopened after China’s 2010 export controls, still sent 98 percent of its raw materials to China in 2019 due to the lack of U.S. processing capacity.

https://mpmaterials.com/mountain-pass

With our re-commissioned processing facilities, we now deliver separated and refined products, including high-purity NdPr oxide, the cornerstone of the world’s strongest and most efficient permanent magnets.

I don't know what portion of processing you're capable of doing for what materials, but I sure hope that you guys have found a way to fill that processing capacity gap and reliance at some point between 2019 and now.

EDIT: Though Russia's been obtaining US components via shell companies in China using false pretenses, and I suppose that that's a sword that cuts two ways, unless China intends on also cutting off the rest of the world. We've played the "shell company in other countries" game ourselves, and I imagine could do so again if need be.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_SR-71_Blackbird

The Lockheed SR-71 "Blackbird" is a retired long-range, high-altitude, Mach 3+ strategic reconnaissance aircraft developed and manufactured by the American aerospace company Lockheed Corporation.[N 1] Its nicknames include "Blackbird" and "Habu".[1]

The SR-71 was developed in the 1960s as a black project by Lockheed's Skunk Works division.

Titanium was used for 85% of the structure, with much of the rest being polymer composite materials.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/crazy-story-how-russia-helped-build-sr-71-blackbird-187431

The more significant problem, however, was that the United States simply did not have sufficient reserves of domestic titanium ore to construct planes from. The Soviet Union, however, did and had made it available for export.

Of course, if the Soviet Union had known that its exports were being used to build American planes, then it certainly would not have sold them. And even if the United States had not declared the purpose of its imports, bureaucrats in Moscow would likely have raised their eyebrows at the quantities of titanium that the U.S. government was suddenly interested in. This led the Central Intelligence Agency to begin a program of clandestinely buying the ore, using dummy corporations and third world countries as intermediaries.

Ultimately, the CIA was able to secure enough titanium to construct 32 SR-71s, along with more than a dozen A-12s and a handful of derivative planes—all from minerals illicitly obtained from the Soviet Union.